Minister's Mosquito Parable as Iran Solution
Education Minister Naftali Bennett
(Jewish Home). (Tsachi Miri/TPS)
The following speech was delivered by
Education Minister Naftali Bennett (Bayit Yehudi/Jewish Home) at The Institute
for National Security Studies (INSS) 2018 Conference on Wednesday in
Tel Aviv. Using a simple parable, Bennett illustrated precisely why solutions
for Iranian sponsored terror have been unsuccessful and what must be done to
solve the problem.
“There was once a good farmer, who
tirelessly worked his fields. One day he was bitten by a mosquito. He
scratched the bite and moved on. And then more mosquitos and more
bites followed. So he decided to take action. He bought a mosquito-swatter.
Whenever a mosquito came, he’d fight it. At times he won, and other
times he was bitten. Because the mosquitos persisted, he developed a
special mosquito net. He surrounded his bed, and his room, and
eventually his entire house, with it. Nonetheless, the mosquitos found
holes and bit him and his family. Our farmer and an innovative and high-tech
oriented mind, so he turned to the technological industries. At his request,
they developed a device which identified mosquitos in flight and
intercepted them with a small missile. But the mosquitos persisted.
The farmer sat on his balcony and
wondered – what should I do? One day his older and wise father came and said,
‘Son, why don’t you dry out the swamp next to us?'” Bennett then applied his
parable to the situation in the Middle East. “Ladies and gentlemen, our farmer
was a great tactician; however he lacked an overall strategy. For over 30 years
Iran has been sending mosquitos our way. Once from a base in Lebanon.
Once from a base in Gaza. Now she’s trying to build a base in Syria.”
“And for 30 years Israel has been
careful about fighting the mosquitos, the messengers: fighting Hezbollah
and Hamas.” “Israel has paid a heavy price. Hundreds of soldiers have fallen in
battles with the Iranian messengers. Many civilians have been killed by these
messengers. In the war with Hezbollah during the 1980s and ’90s hundreds of soldiers
fell. In the Second Lebanon War 121 soldiers, and 144 civilians, were killed.”
“And during this entire time, the
sender in Tehran – the swamp creating the mosquitos – has been immune
from paying a price. He sends the enemies to us but rests in Tehran free of
concern. Israel has advanced tactics against Iran’s messengers: we’ve equipped
ourselves with advanced weapons, developed the amazing Iron Dome system which
has saved many lives, used precision-guided munitions, established the EGOZ
unit with its special operative methodologies, and more.”
“But while our tactic responses
improved, we remained locked in a narrow strategy. The strategy says: fight the
messenger. Fight whoever is shooting at you. To avoid a war in the north, we
must broaden our strategic scope. First, we must understand Iran’s plan. Iran’s
strategy against Israel is that of an octopus strangle. What this means, is a
constant strategic wrapping, tiring and strangling of Israel through proxies
and messengers. It attempts to hurt our economy, our daily lives, and our
patience – in order to break the Israeli public’s spirit.”
“Hasan Nasrallah (Secretary Genral of
Hezbollah) explained it well in his ‘spider web’ speech. How exactly does Iran
do this? The head of the octopus sits in Tehran and sends its tentacles to the
areas on Israel’s periphery. One arm, as already stated, is the Hezbollah in
Lebanon. Another arm is the Hamas in Gaza. Now Iran is trying to establish a
third Arm in Syria using Iranian militias. We won’t let her do so.”
“The connection between the head of the
octopus in Tehran and the various tentacles is not absolute. For example, Hamas
is a Sunni organization and does not view itself as a complete subordinate of
Tehran. The Iranian influence on Hamas depends on the people leading Hamas,
their attitude towards Iran, the Iranian financial support, and other factors.”
“Recently the Iranian influence on Hamas has increased, as we witnessed in the
recent visit of Saleh al-Arouri, a prominent Hamas leader, in Tehran. The head
of the Iranian octopus has more of an influence on Hezbollah, but it too is not
complete, as we will see.
“The Iranian chain of action has four
components: the sender, the distributor, the host and the messenger. So, in the
Lebanese case, the sender is Iran; the distributor is the Quds Force; the host
is Lebanon; and the messenger actively attacking Israel is Hezbollah. In Gaza:
the sender, again, is Iran; the distributor – the Quds Force; the host is Gaza;
and the messenger Hamas. In Syria: the sender and distributor are, as usual,
Iran and the Quds Force; the host is Syria and the messengers are Iranian
militias.”
“In the face of this octopus strategy,
Israel has focused for 30 years on fighting the messengers. We have barely
touched the hosts. We have not dealt at all with the distributor or sender. During
the 1990s, when we fought in Southern Lebanon, we fought Hezbollah. As a
company commander, I led a series of missions to take out key Hezbollah
leaders, and I saw a constant improvement in our abilities. Yet the framework
always remained a fight against one arm of the octopus.”
“From the 1990s till the 2000s we
specialized in hunting rocket launchers, while Hezbollah grew in sophistication
over time. At first, Hezbollah launched missiles from open areas, and we did a
good job destroying them. In the second phase, Hezbollah hid the launchers in
overgrown areas, which we nicknamed ‘nature reserves.’ This required us
physically arriving at the site to destroy the launchers, like in the battles
of Marun a-Ras, which was a battle with lots of friction and casualties. In the
third phase, Hezbollah did a good job of planting the rockets in homes, turning
dozens of villages in South Lebanon to missile launching bases. The houses now
have a kitchen, a living room, a parents’ room, a children’s bedroom and a
rocket room. Hezbollah did this knowing Israel would not target
civilian-populated areas.
Today we can say: there is no surgical
way to destroy rocket launchers within houses, without collateral damage. There
is no tweezer technology. I saw this at the start of the Second Lebanon War
while commanding, once again, a search and destroy mission in the western parts
of South Lebanon, not far from Debel. Our mission, to stop the firing of
rockets into Israel, was impossible. Yes, we had successes, but could not stop
the massive firing into Israel. Not because the IDF forces aren’t capable – but
because you cannot arrive physically at each and every launch site. The
messenger, Hezbollah, is well embedded in the host, Lebanon. It’s very hard to
hit the ‘needle’ – Hezbollah – in the haystack of Lebanon.”
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